







Universidade de Aveiro 







Documentos de Trabalho em Economia 
















Bubbles and crashes in a behavioural finance model* 
 
Paul De Grauwe and Marianna Grimaldi 
 
*This paper was presented by Paul De Grauwe in the  
Inaugural Seminar of the Academic Year at DEGEI  




Submission of Papers for Publication (Para submissão de artigos para publicação): Prof. Francisco 
Torres (ftorres@egi.ua.pt). Universidade de Aveiro, DEGEI, Economia, Campus Universitário de 
Santiago. 3810-193 Aveiro. Portugal. Bubbles and crashes
in a behavioural ﬁnance model
Paul De Grauwe and Marianna Grimaldi∗
University of Leuven and Sveriges Riksbank
July 16, 2004
Abstract
We develop a simple model of the exchange rate in which agents op-
timize their portfolio and use diﬀerent forecasting rules. They check the
proﬁtability of these rules ex post and select the more proﬁtable one.This
model produces two kinds of equilibria, a fundamental and a bubble one.
In a stochastic environment the model generates a complex dynamics in
which bubbles and crashes occur at unpredictable moments. We contrast
these "behavioural" bubbles with "rational" bubbles.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A bubble is:”... a sharp rise in price of an asset or a range of assets in a contin-
uous process, with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and
attracting new buyers-generally speculators, interested in proﬁts from trading
in the asset rather than its use as earning capacity”- Kindleberger(1978). Since
the publication of Kindleberger’s ”Manias, Panics, and Crashes” in 1978, a large
literature has ﬂourished on bubbles and crashes in ﬁnancial markets. Two key
questions have been analysed in this literature. One is whether bubbles can
occur in theory; the other is whether they occur in practice. In this paper we
will analyse the ﬁrst question.
It is well-known that in models with fully and perfectly informed agents there
are inﬁnitely many solutions for the asset price. One is the ”fundamental”
solution, and the other (in fact inﬁnitely many) is the bubble solution. The
latter is an explosive path of the asset price that increasingly deviates from the
fundamental, but that continues to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. Clearly
such a deﬁnition of a bubble is not interesting in a perfect foresight environment
because it means that either the bubble goes on indeﬁnetely, or if a crash is
expected at some future date, the bubble will not start (because of backward
induction).
The insight provided by Blanchard and Watson (see Blanchard(1979), Blan-
chard and Watson(1982)) was to formulate a bubble theory in a stochastic en-
vironment, and to assume that when the asset price is on an explosive bubble
path, rational agents expect a future crash but do not know its exact timing
. This analysis came to the conclusion that a bubble, deﬁn e da sa ne x p l o s i v e
path of the asset price, is a theoretical possibility. The analysis of Blanchard
and Watson has spurred a large literature extending this initial insight and
analysing the conditions for the emergence of bubbles in models with fully and
perfectly informed agents1. Blanchard labelled such bubbles ”rational bubbles”
(Blanchard(1986)). Following Blanchard we will call the bubble which arises in
stochastic rational expectations models ”rational bubbles”.
Yet this ”rational bubble” theory has a weakness. The weak part of this
theory is in the modelling of the crash. The latter is introduced in an ad-hoc
fashion, i.e. agents are assumed to expect a crash, although this expectation
does not come from the structure of the model itself. It is based on some
reasonable but model-exogenous assumption that bubbles cannot go on forever.
A further extension of the rational bubble theory consisted in allowing for
heterogeneity of traders. Models were developed in which rational traders in-
teract with ”noise traders” (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann(1990),
Shleifer and Vishny(1997)). The essence of these models is that some constraints
exist on the capacity of the rational traders to exploit the proﬁt opportunities
generated by the bubble. These limits to arbitrage arise because of risk aversion
1There have been extensions of the basic model in general equilibrium settings. In such
an environment it can be shown that the existence of a substitute asset or a ﬁnite number of
agents prevents bubbles from occurring. But then there will be no crash either. For example,
there will be no ﬁnancial crises (see Tirole(1982)).
2or capital constraints. More recently, Abreu and Brunnermeier(2003) have de-
veloped models in which the arbitrage failure by rational traders arises because
they have diﬀerent views about the timing of the crash and fail to synchronize
their exit strategies.
The deﬁnition of a bubble as an unstable path of the asset price is not
the only possible deﬁnition of a bubble. In this paper we use an alternative
deﬁnition, i.e. a bubble as a ﬁxed point equilibrium. This deﬁnition arises
quite naturally in a model in which all agents are ”boundedly rational”, i.e. in
which individual agents face great uncertainty and thus have a limited ability
to process and to analyse the available information (see Simon(1955), Johansen
and Sornette(1999)).. We assume that, as a result, the boundedly rational
agents select simple forecasting rules. These agents, however, exhibit sophis-
ticated behaviour in the sense that they check the proﬁtability of these rules
and are willing to switch to the more proﬁtable one. This approach is also
very much inﬂuenced by the literature of ”behavioural ﬁnance” (Tversky and
Kahneman(1981), Thaler(1994), Shleifer(2000), Kahneman(2002), Barberis and
Thaler(2002)).
We will show that in a model with boundedly rational agents two types
of equilibria exist, a fundamental equilibrium and a bubble equilibrium. The
latter will be shown to be a ﬁxed point equilibrium. We will then analyse the
nature of these bubble equilibria and the conditions in which they are working as
attactors. The model will be formulated in the context of the exchange market2.
2 The model
In this section we develop the simple version of the exchange rate model. As
will be seen, the model can be interpreted more generally as a model describing
any risky asset price. The model consists of three building blocks. First, utility
maximising agents select their optimal portfolio using a mean-variance utility
framework. Second, these agents make forecasts about the future exchange rate
based on simple but diﬀerent rules. In this second building block we introduce
concepts borrowed from the behavioural ﬁnance literature. Third, agents evalu-
ate these rules ex-post by comparing their risk-adjusted proﬁtability. Thus, the
third building block relies on an evolutionary economics.
2.1 The optimal portfolio
We assume agents of diﬀerent types i depending on their beliefs about the future
exchange rate. Each agent can invest in two assets, a domestic (risk-free) asset









2Its basic structure can also be applied to other asset markets.
3where Wi
t+1 is the wealth of agent of type i at time t +1 , Et is the expecta-
tion operator, µ is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and V i(Wi
t+1) represents the










where r and r∗ are respectively the domestic and the foreign interest rates
(which are known with certainty), st+1 i st h ee x c h a n g er a t ea tt i m et +1 , di,t
represents the holdings of the foreign assets by agent of type i at time t.T h u s ,
the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of 2 represents the value of the (risky)
foreign portfolio expressed in domestic currency at time t +1while the second
term represents the value of the (riskless) domestic portfolio at time t +1 3.
Substituiting equation 2 in 1 and maximising the utility with respect to di,t









i,t =( 1+r∗)2V i
t (st+1). The optimal holding of the foreign asset depends
on the expected excess return (corrected for risk) of the foreign asset. The market
demand for foreign assets at time t is the sum of the individual demands, i.e.:
N X
i=1
ni,tdi,t = Dt (4)
where ni,t is the number of agents of type i.
Market equilibrium implies that the market demand is equal to the market
supply Zt w h i c hw ea s s u m et ob ee x o g e n o u s 5.T h u s ,
Zt = Dt (5)
Substituting the optimal holdings into the market demand and then into the
market equilibrium equation and solving for the exchange rate st yields the























3The model could be interpreted as an asset pricing model with one risky asset (e.g. shares)
and a risk free asset. Equation (2) would then be written as
Wi







where st+1is the price of the share in t+1 and yt+1is the dividend per share in t+1.
4If the model is interpreted as an asset pricing model of one risky asset (shares) and a risk






5The market supply is determined by the net current account and by the sales or purchases
of foreign exchange of the central bank. We assume both to be exogenous here. In section 9













Thus the market clearing exchange rate is determined by the forecasts of the
agents, Ei
t , about the future exchange rate.
Note also that the forecasts are weighted by their respective variances σ2
i,t.
When agent’s i forecasts have a high variance the weight of this agent in the
determination of the market exchange rate is reduced. In the following we will
set r = r∗.
2.2 The forecasting rules
We now specify how agents form their expectations of the future exchange rate
and how they evaluate the risk of their portfolio.
We start with an analysis of the rules agents use in forecasting the exchange
rate. We take the view that individual agents are overwhelmed by the complex-
ity of the informational environment, and therefore use simple rules to make
forecasts. Here we describe these rules. In the next section we discuss how
agents select the rules.
We assume that two types of forecasting rules are used. One is called a
”fundamentalist” rule, the other a ”technical trading” rule6. The agents using
a fundamentalist rule, the ”fundamentalists”, base their forecast on a compari-
son between the market and the fundamental exchange rate, i.e. they forecast
the market rate to return to the fundamental rate in the future. In this sense
they use a negative feedback rule that introduces a mean reverting dynamics in
the exchange rate. The speed with which the market exchange rate returns to
the fundamental is assumed to be determined by the speed of adjustment in the
goods market which is assumed to be in the information set of the fundamental-
ists (together with the fundamental exchange rate itself). Thus, the forecasting










t i st h ef u n d a m e n t a le x c h a n g er a t ea tt i m et , which is assumed to follow
a random walk and 0 <ψ<1. We assume that the fundamental exchange rate
is exogenous.
The timing of the forecasts is important. When fundamentalists forecast
the future exchange rate they use publicly available information up to period
t −1. This implies that fundamentalists make their forecasts before the market
clearing exchange rate st has been revealed to them. This assumption is in
the logic of the model used here in which agents do not know the full model
structure. As a result, they cannot compute the market clearing exchange rate
of time t that will be the result of their decisions made in period t7.
6The idea of distinguishing between fundamentalist and technical traders rules was ﬁrst
introduced by Frankel and Froot(1986).
7In an environment with fully and perfectly informed agents , agents know the underlying
model and are capable of making such calculations. As a result, in such models agents use
information about the exchange rate at time t.
5The timing assumption underlying the agents’ forecasts in (7) allows us to
derive the market clearing exchange rate in (6) as a unique price for which
demand equals supply (see Brock and Hommes(1998)). An issue that arises
here is how this timing assumption can be made consistent with the optimi-
sation process described in the previous section. There we assumed that when
computing their optimal holdings of foreign assets in period t, agents have infor-
mation about the exchange rate in period t. The inconsistency is only apparent.
The optimal holdings derived in equation (3) can be interpreted as a Marshalian
demand curve in which an auctioneer announces a price, st. Agents then decide
on their optimal holdings conditioned on this announced price. The auctioneer
then collects the bids and oﬀers, and computes the market clearing price. The
latter is not in the information set of the agents when they make their forecasts
for the exchange rate in period t +1 .
The agents using technical analysis, the ”technical traders”, forecast the
future exchange rate by extrapolating past exchange rate movements. Their






Thus, the technical traders compute a moving average of the past exchange rate
changes and they extrapolate this into the future exchange rate change. The
degree of extrapolation is given by the parameter β. Technical traders take into
account information concerning the fundamental exchange rate indirectly, i.e.
through the exchange rate itself. In addition, technical rules can be interpreted
as rules that attempt to detect ”market sentiments”. In this sense the technical
trader rules can be seen as reﬂecting herding behaviour8. Note that the same
assumption about the timing of the information set is used here as in the case
of fundamentalist forecasting.
It should be stressed that both types of agents, technical traders and funda-
mentalists, use limited information.
We now analyse how fundamentalists and technical traders evaluate the risk
of their portfolio. The risk is measured by the variance terms in equation 6,
which we deﬁne as the weighted average of the squared (one period ahead)








t−k (st−k) − st−k
¤2
(9)
where θk =( 1− θ)θ
k are geometrically declining weights (0 <θ<1) ,a n d
i = f,c.
8There is a large literature on the use of technical analysis. This literature makes clear that
technical trading is widely used in the foreign exchange markets. See Cheung and Chinn(1989),
Taylor and Allen(1992), Cheung et al(1999), Mentkhoﬀ(1997) and (1998).
62.3 Fitness of the rules
The next step in our analysis is to specify how agents evaluate the ﬁtness of
these two forecasting rules. The general idea that we will follow is that agents
use one of the two rules, compare their (risk adjusted) proﬁtability ex post and
then decide whether to keep the rule or switch to the other one. Thus, our
model is in the logic of evolutionary dynamics, in which simple decision rules
are selected. These rules will continue to be followed if they pass some ”ﬁtness”
test (proﬁtability test). Another way to interpret this is as follows. When great
uncertainty exists about how the complex world functions, agents use a trial
and error strategy. They try a particular forecasting rule until they ﬁnd out
that other rules work better. Such a trial and error strategy is the best strategy
agents can use when cannot understand the full complexity of the underlying
model.
In order to implement this idea we use an approach proposed by Brock and
Hommes(1997) which consists in making the weights of the forecasting rules a



































f,t−1 are the risk adjusted net proﬁts made by technical
traders’ and fundamentalists’ forecasting the exchange rate in period t − 1, i.e.
π0
c,t−1 = πc,t−1 − µσ2
c,t−1 and π0
f,t−1 = πf,t−1 − µσ2
f,t−1.
Equations 10 and 11 can be interpreted as switching rules. When the risk
adjusted proﬁts of the technical traders’ rule increases relative to the risk ad-
justed net proﬁts of the fundamentalists rule, then the share of agents who
switches and use technical trader rules in period t increases, and vice versa.
This parameter γ measures the intensity with which the technical traders and
fundamentalists revise their forecasting rules. With an increasing γ agents react
strongly to the relative proﬁtability of the rules. In the limit when γ goes to
inﬁnity all agents choose the forecasting rule which proves to be more proﬁtable.
When γ is equal to zero agents are insensitive to the relative proﬁtability of the
rules. In the latter case the fraction of technical traders and fundamentalists
is constant and equal to 0.5.T h u s ,γ is a measure of inertia in the decision to
switch to the more proﬁtable rule10. As will be seen, this parameter is of great
9This speciﬁcation of the decision rule is often used in discrete choice models. For an ap-
p l i c a t i o ni nt h em a r k e tf o rd i ﬀerentiated products see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse(1992).
The idea has also been applied in ﬁnancial markets, by Brock and Hommes (1997) and by
Lux(1998).
10The psychological literature reveals that there is a lot of evidence of a ”status quo bias”
in decision making (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler(1991). This implies γ<∞. Thus we
set 0 <γ<∞.
7importance in generating bubbles.
We depart from the Brock-Hommes approach in the way we deﬁne proﬁts. In
Brock-Hommes proﬁts are deﬁned as the total earnings on the optimal foreign
asset holdings. We deﬁne the proﬁts as the one-period earnings of investing $1
in the foreign asset. More formally,
πi,t =[ st (1 + r∗) − st−1 (1 + r)]sgn
£
(1 + r∗)Ei








0 for x =0
−1 for x<0
and i = c,f
Thus, when agents forecasted an increase in the exchange rate and this
increase is realized, their per unit proﬁt is equal to the observed increase in the
exchange rate (corrected for the interest diﬀerential). If instead the exchange
rate declines, they make a per unit loss which equals this decline (because in
this case they have bought foreign assets which have declined in price).
We use a concept of proﬁts per unit invested for two reasons. First, our
switching rules of equations 11 and 10 selects the ﬁttest rules. It does not
select agents. To make this clear, suppose that technical traders happen to
have more wealth than fundamentalists so that their total proﬁts exceeds the
fundamentalists’ proﬁts despite the fact that the technical rule happens to be
less proﬁtable (per unit invested) than the fundamentalist rule. In this case,
our switching rule will select the fundamentalists rule although the agents who
u s et h i sr u l em a k el e s sp r o ﬁts (because their wealth happens to be small) than
agents using chartist rules. Second, in our deﬁnition of proﬁts agents only have
to use publicly available information, i.e. the forecasting rules and the observed
exchange rate changes. They don’t have to know their competitor’s proﬁts.
3 Solution of the model
In this section we investigate the properties of the solution of the model. We ﬁrst
study its deterministic solution. This will allow us to analyse the characteristics
of the solution that are not clouded by exogenous noise. The model consists of
equations (6) to (11).
3.1 The steady state
The non-linear structure of our model does not allow for a simple analytical
solution. Hereby, we analyse the steady state of a simpliﬁed version of the
model. For the sake of simplicity we assume that technical traders only take
one lag into account11. In addition, we set Z =0 , and normalize the fundamental
rate, s∗
t = s∗ =0 . W ec a nt h e nw r i t ee q u a t i o n6a sf o l l o w s :
11One can easily add additional lags without altering the steady state analysis.


































Equations 9 deﬁning the variance terms can also be rewritten as follows:
σ2




t−2 (st−1) − st−1
¤2 (17)
σ2





t−2 (st−1) − st−1
i2
(18)
Using the deﬁnition of the forecasting rules 7 and 8, this yields
σ2
c,t =( 1− θ)σ2
c,t−1 + θ[(1 + β)st−3 − βst−2 − st−1]
2 (19)
σ2
f,t =( 1− θ)σ2
f,t−1 + θ[(1 − ψ)st−2 − st−1]
2 (20)
With suitable changes of variables it is possible to write the system as a
6-dimensional system. Set
ut = st−1
xt = ut−1(= st−2)
The 6 dynamic variables are (st,u t,x t,πc,t,σ2
c,t,σ2
f,t). The state of the sys-
tem at time t−1, i.e. (st−1,u t−1,x t−1,z t−1,πc,t−1,σ2
c,t−1,σ2
f,t−1) determines the
state of the system at time t, i.e. (st,u t,x t,πc,t,σ2
c,t,σ2
f,t) through the following
6-D dynamical system:
st =[ 1+β − Θf,t(ψ + β)]st−1 − (1 − Θf,t)βut−1 (21)
ut = st−1 (22)
xt = ut−1 (23)
9πc,t =( st − st−1) sgn [(ut−1 + β(ut−1 − xt−1) − st−1)(st − st−1)] (24)
σ2
c,t =( 1− θ)σ2
c,t−1 + θ[(1 + β)ut−1 − βxt−1 − st−1]
2 (25)
σ2
f,t =( 1− θ)σ2



























πf,t−1 =( st−1 − ut−1)sgn [((1 − ψ)xt−1 − ut−1)(st−1 − ut−1)] (29)
It can now be shown that the model produces two types of steady state
solutions. We analyse these consecutively.
3.1.1 The exchange rate equals the fundamental value.
We normalise the fundamental to be zero. Thus, this solution implies that
st =0 . As a result, the variance terms go to zero. This also means that in the
steady state, the risk adjusted weights of the fundamentalists and chartists are
of the form Θf,t = ∞
∞ and Θc,t = ∞
















One can show by numerical methods that in the steady state the expression
σ2
f,t/σ2
c,t converges to 112. We show this in appendix 1 where we plot the ratio
as a function of time. This implies that in the steady state Θf,t = wf,t and
Θc,t = wc,t .(Note that wf,t + wc,t =1 ) .
The steady state of the system is now obtained by setting
(st−1,u t−1,x t−1,πc,t−1,σ2
f,t−1,σ2





in the dynamical system (21)-26).
There is a unique steady state where
s,u,x =0 , πc =0 ,σ2
f,σ2
c =0
12It does not appear to be possible to show this by analytical methods.








i.e. the steady state is characterized by the exchange rate being at its funda-
mental level, by zero proﬁts and zero risk, and by fundamentalist and technical
trader fractions equal to 1
2.
3.1.2 The exchange rate equals a non-fundamental value
The model allows for a second type of steady state solution. This is a solu-
tion in which the exchange rate is constant and permanently diﬀerent from its
(constant) fundamental value. In other words the model allows for a constant
non-zero exchange rate in the steady state.
The existence of such an equilibrium can be shown as follows. We use 13 and
set st = st−1 = st−2 = s, so that
−Θf,tψs =0 (32)
It can now easily be seen that if Θf,t =0 , any constant exchange rate
will satisfy this equation. From the deﬁnition of Θf,t we ﬁnd that a suﬃcient
condition for Θf,t to be zero is that σ2
f,t = σ2
f > 0, and σ2
c,t = σ2
c =0 .N o t e
that in this case Θc,t =1and σ2
f = ψ
2s2. Put diﬀerently, there exist ﬁxed point
equilibria in the steady state with the following characteristics: the exchange
rate deviates from the fundamental by a constant amount; thus, fundamentalist
forecasting rules lead to a constant error and therefore the risk adjusted share
of fundamentalist rules is zero13. The latter is necessary, otherwise agents would
still be using the rule so that their forecast of a reversion to the fundamental
would move the exchange rate.
We will call this non-fundamental equilibrium a bubble equilibrium. We call
it a bubble equilibrium because it is an equilibrium in which fundamentalists
exert no inﬂuence on the exchange rate. It should be stressed that this deﬁnition
of a bubble is very diﬀerent from the ”rational bubble” which is deﬁned as an
unstable path of the exchange rate. It comes closer to the notion of ”sunspots”
which is also an equilibrium concept in rational expectations models (see Blan-
chard and Fischer(1989), p255). We will come back to this in section 9 where
we will contrast our bubble equilibria with sunspot equilibria.
With this dynamical system it is not possible to perform the local stability
analysis of the steady state with the usual techniques, based upon the analysis of
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state. The reason
is that the “map” whose iteration generates the dynamics is not diﬀerentiable
at the steady state (in fact the map is not diﬀerentiable, for instance, on the
locus of the phase-space of equation s = u, and the steady state belongs to this
subset of the phase space).
13Note that this does not imply that the share of the fundamentalists, wf,t =0as can be
seen from equation (10).
113.2 Numerical analysis
The strong non-linearities make an analysis of the model’s global stability im-
possible. Therefore, we use simulation techniques which we will present in this
and the following sections. We select ” reasonable” values of the parameters,
i.e. those that come close to empirically observed values. In appendix 2 we
present a table with the numerical values of the parameters of the model and
the lags involved. We will analyse how sensitive the solution is to diﬀerent sets
of parameter values. The dynamical modelu s e di nt h en u m e r i c a la n a l y s i si st h e
same one as in the previous section except for the number of lags in the techni-
cal traders’ forecasting rule. We now return to the speciﬁcation of the technical
traders’s rule as given by 8. As a result, (13) becomes




where T =5 . Thus, the full model with all its lags is a 10-dimensional
dynamic system.
In ﬁgure 1 we show the solutions of the exchange rate for diﬀerent initial con-
ditions. On the horizontal axis we set out the diﬀerent initial conditions. These
are initial shocks to the exchange rate in the period before the simulation is
started14. The vertical axis shows the solutions corresponding to these diﬀerent
initial conditions. These were obtained from simulating the model over 10000
periods. We found that after such a long period the exchange rate had stabilized
to a ﬁxed point (a ﬁxed attractor). The fundamental exchange rate was nor-
malized to 0.W eﬁnd the two types of ﬁxed point solutions that we discussed
in the previous section. First, for small disturbances in the initial conditions
the ﬁxed point solutions coincide with the fundamental exchange rate. We call
these solutions the fundamental solutions. Second, for large disturbances in the
initial conditions, the ﬁxed point solutions diverge from the fundamental. We
will call these attractors, bubble attractors15. It will become clear why we label
these attractors in this way. The larger is the initial shock (the noise) the farther
the ﬁxed points are removed from the fundamental exchange rate. The border
between these two types of ﬁxed points is characterised by discontinuities. This
has the implication that in the neighbourhood of the border a small change in
the initial condition (the noise) can have a large eﬀect on the solution.We return
to this issue. The diﬀerent nature of these two types of ﬁxed point attractors
can also be seen from an analysis of the technical traders’ weights that corre-
spond to these diﬀerent ﬁxed point attractors. We show these technical traders’
weights as a function of the initial conditions in ﬁgure 2.
14There are longer lags in the model, i.e. ﬁve Thus we set the exchange rate with a lag
of more than one period before the start equal to 0. This means that the initial conditions
are one-period shocks in the exchange rate prior to the start of the simulation. All the other
lagged dynamic variables are set equal to 0 when the simulation is started.
15We use the word ”bubble” in a diﬀerent way than in the rational expectations literature.
We discuss this in a later section.
12Figure 1:
Figure 2:
13We ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that for small initial disturbances the technical traders’ weight
converges to 50% of the market. Thus when the exchange rate converges to the
fundamental rate, the weight of the technical traders and the fundamentalists
are equal to 50%. For large initial disturbances, however, the technical traders’
weight comes close 1. Thus, when the technical traders take over most of the
market, the exchange rate converges to a bubble attractor16.T h em e a n i n go fa
bubble attractor can now be understood better. It is an exchange rate equilib-
rium that is reached when the number of fundamentalists has become suﬃciently
small (the number of technical traders has become suﬃciently large) so as to
eliminate the eﬀect of the mean reversion dynamics. It will be made clearer in
the next section why fundamentalists drop out of the market. Here it suﬃces to
understand that such equilibria exist. It is important to see that these bubble
attractors are ﬁxed point solutions. Once we reach them, the exchange rate
is constant. The technical traders’ expectations are then model consistent, i.e.
technical traders who extrapolate the past movements, forecast no change. At
the same time, since the fundamentalists have all but left the market, there is no
f o r c ea c t i n gt ob r i n gb a c kt h ee x c h a n g er a t et oi t sf u n d a m e n t a lv a l u e .T h u st w o
types of equilibria exist: a fundamental equilibrium where technical traders and
fundamentalists co-exist, and a bubble equilibrium where the technical traders
have crowded out the fundamentalists17. In both cases, the expectations of the
agents in the model are consistent with the model’s outcome.
These two types of equilibria diﬀer in another respect. The fundamental
equilibrium can be reached from many diﬀerent initial conditions. It is locally
stable, i.e after small disturbances the system returns to the same (fundamental)
attractor. In contrast there is one and only one initial condition that will lead
to a particular bubble equilibrium. This implies that a small disturbance leads
to a displacement of the bubble solution. Note also that the border between
these two types of equilibria is characterized by discontinuities and complexity,
i.e. small disturbances can lead to either a fundamental or a bubble equilib-
rium. We show the nature of this complexity in the ﬁgures 3 and 4. These
present two successive enlargements of ﬁgure 1 around the initial condition, 5,
where the fundamental and bubble equilibria appear to overlap. We observe that
small changes in the initial conditions can switch the equilibrium point from a
fundamental to a bubble equilibrium, and vice versa. The second enlargement
shows the replicating nature of the enlargements. The ”holes” in the line seg-
ment describing the fundamental equilibrium in the ﬁrst enlargement are now
ﬁlled up with fundamental equilibria that were not visible in the ﬁrst enlarge-
ment. Thus, we ﬁnd that in the border region between fundamental and bubble
equilibria there is sensitivity to initial conditions, i.e. trivially small shocks can
lead to switches in the nature of the equilibrium to which the exchange rate is
16I nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o nw eh a v es h o w nt h a ts u c hab u b b l ee x i s t sw h e nt h er i s ka d j u s t e d
weight of the chartists Ωc =1 .
17Note that the intermediate points, i.e. when chartists’ weight is less than 1 the solution
has not converged yet to ﬁxed points. Fundamentalists hold a very small share in the market
which exerts some mean reverting force. However their inﬂuence is oﬀset by the chartists
pressure. In ﬁgure 2 the simulation results are for T=100000.
14attracted. This also suggests that these ﬁxed point attractors are surrounded
by basins of attraction that are separated by complex borders. We will return
to informational issues produced by this result.
4 The anatomy of bubbles and crashes
In the previous section we identiﬁed the existence of two diﬀerent types of ﬁxed
point solutions, i.e. a fundamental solution characterised by the fact that the
exchange rate converges to its fundamental value while technical traders and
fundamentalists ”co-habitate”, and a bubble solution in which the exchange rate
deviates from its fundamental value and in which technical traders dominate the
market. In this section we show that in combination with stochastic shocks in
the fundamental exchange rate these features of the model lead to the emergence
of bubbles and crashes. Again we selected a particular set of parameter values.
In section 5 we present a sensitivity analysis.
We start by presenting a case study of a typical bubble and crash scenario as
produced by the stochastic version of the model. Figure 5 top panel shows the
exchange rate and its fundamental value in the time domain; the bottom panel
s h o w st h ew e i g h to ft h ec h a r t i s t si nt h es a m et i m ed o m a i n .T h e s et w op i c t u r e s
allow us to analyse a number of common features of a typical endogenously
generated bubble and crash in a stochastic environment.
First, once a bubble emerges, it sets in motion bandwagon eﬀects. As the
exchange rate moves steadily in one direction, the use of extrapolative forecast-
ing rules becomes more proﬁtable, thereby attracting more technical traders
in the market. This is clearly visible from a comparison of the bottom panel
with the top panel of ﬁgure 5. We observe that the upward movement in the
exchange rate coincides with an increase in the weight of technical traders in
the market. We have checked this feature in many bubbles produced by the
model. In appendix 3 we show another example of a bubble, and we present the
results of a causality test which shows that the exchange rate leads the weight
of technical traders during a bubble and the subsequent crash. Thus, typically
a bubble starts after the exchange rate has moved in one direction, thereby at-
tracting extrapolating technical traders which, in turn, reinforces the exchange
rate movement.
Second, a sustained upward (downward) movement of the exchange rate will
not develop into a full scale bubble if at some point the market does not get suﬃ-
ciently dominated by the technical traders. As can be seen ﬁgure 5 at the height
of the bubble the technical traders have almost 100% of the market. Put diﬀer-
ently, an essential characteristic of a bubble is that at some point most agents
are not willing to take a contrarian fundamentalist view. The market is then
dominated by agents who extrapolate the bubble into the future. This raises
the question of why fundamentalists do not take an opposite position thereby
preventing the bubble from developing. After all, the larger the deviation of






to make proﬁt from selling the foreign currency. Yet they do not, and massively
leave the marketplace to the technical traders. The reason is twofold. First, dur-
ing the bubble phase the proﬁtability of technical trading increases dramatically
precisely because so many technical traders enter the market thereby pushing
the exchange rate up and making technical trading more proﬁtable. Second,
during the bubble phase fundamentalists make large forecasting errors, reduc-
ing their ”appetite” for using fundamentalists forecasting rules. Put diﬀerently,
during the bubble phase the riskiness of taking a fundamentalist position (as
measured by forecast errors) increases dramatically relative to the riskiness of
extrapolative forecasting. As a result, of these two eﬀects fundamental investors
who are continuously acting against the trend will tend to drop out. There is
therefore a self-fulﬁling dynamics in the proﬁtability of technical trading and
losses for the fundamentalists.
17The limit of this dynamics is reached when technical traders have crowded
out the fundamentalists. We arrive at our next characteristics of the bubble-
crash dynamics. When the technical traders’ share is close to 100% the self-
reinforcing upward movement in the exchange rate and in proﬁtability slows
down, increasing the relative proﬁtability of fundamentalists. An exogenous
shock, e.g. a shock in the fundamental, can then trigger a fast decline in the
share of technical trading, back to its normal level of a tranquil market. A crash
is set in motion. We come back to issue of why a crash must necessarily occur
in this model.
The dynamics of bubbles and crashes we obtain in our simulated data is
asymmetric, i.e. bubbles are relatively slow and crashes relatively rapid. An
intuitive explanation of this result is that during a bubble technical traders’
and fundamentalists’ rules push the exchange rate in two diﬀerent directions,
i.e. the positive feedback from technical traders and the negative feedback from
fundamentalists have the eﬀect of slowing down the build-up of a bubble. In a
crash the fundamentalists’ mean reverting force is reinforced by the technical
traders’ behaviour. As a consequence, the speed of a crash is higher than the
speed with which a bubble arises.
This asymmetry between bubbles and crashes is a well-known empirical phe-
nomenon in ﬁnancial markets (see Sornette(2003)). In ﬁgure 6 we present the
DEM-USD for the period 1980-1987, which is a remarkable example of a bubble
in foreign exchange markets. As it can be seen from ﬁgure 6 the upward move-
ment in the DEM-USD exchange rate is gradual and builds up momentum until
a sudden and much faster crash occurs which brings the exchange rate back to
its value of tranquil periods. Our model provides a simple explanation for this
empirical phenomenon18.
5 Sensitivity analysis: the deterministic model
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis of the deterministic model. This
will allow us to describe how the space of fundamental and bubble equilibria is
aﬀected by diﬀerent values of the parameters of the model. In this section we
concentrate on two parameters, i.e. β (the extrapolation parameter of techni-
cal traders) and γ (the sensitivity of technical traders and fundamentalists to
relative proﬁtability).
5.1 Sensitivity with respect to β
We show the result of a sensitivity analysis with respect to β in ﬁgure 7, which
is a three-dimensional version of ﬁgure 1. The ﬁxed attractors (i.e. the solutions
18Note the contrast with rational expectations models of bubbles and crashes. These predict
that bubbles and crashes are symmetric (Blanchard(1979) and Blanchard&Watson(1982))
M o r e o v e r ,t h es y m m e t r yo fb u b b l e sa n dc r a s h e sn e g l e c t st h et i m es c a l ed y n a m i c si nw h i c ha
long term change is an accumulation of short term changes. Thus, the symmetry property in
foreign exchange markets is an approximation which holds only in the (very) short-run (see










































of the exchange rate) are shown on the vertical axis. The initial conditions are
s h o w no nt h ex - a x i sa n dt h ed i ﬀerent values for β on the z-axis. Thus, the two-
dimensional ﬁgure 1 in section 3 is a ’slice’ of ﬁgure 7 obtained for one particular
value of β (0.8 in ﬁgure 1).
We observe that for suﬃciently low values of β we obtain only fundamental
equilibria whatever the initial conditions. As β increases the plane which repre-
sents the collection of the fundamental equilibria narrows. At the same time the
space taken by the bubble equilibria increases, and these bubble equilibria tend
to increasingly diverge from the fundamental equilibria. Thus as the extrapo-
lation parameter increases, smaller and smaller shocks in the initial conditions
will push the exchange rate into the space of bubble equilibria. Put diﬀerently,
as β increases, the probability of obtaining a bubble equilibrium increases.
Note also that the boundary between the fundamental and the bubble equi-
libria is a complex one. The boundary has a fractal dimension. We return to
this issue in section 9.
5.2 Sensitivity with respect to γ
The parameter γ is equally important in determining whether fundamental or
bubble equilibria will prevail. We show its importance in ﬁgure 8, which presents
a similar three-dimensional ﬁgure relating the ﬁxed attractors to both the ini-
tial conditions and the values of γ.W e ﬁnd that for γ =0or close to 0,a l l
equilibria are fundamental ones. Thus, when agents are not sensitive to chang-
ing proﬁtability of forecasting rules, the exchange rate will always converge to
the fundamental equilibrium whatever the initial condition. As γ increases, the
19space of fundamental equilibria shrinks. With suﬃciently high values of γ, small
initial disturbances (noise) are suﬃcient to push the exchange rate into a bub-
ble equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, as γ increases, the probability of obtaining a
bubble equilibrium increases. Finally, as in the case of β,w ea l s oo b s e r v et h a t
the boundary between the bubble and fundamental equilibria is complex.
6 The frequency of bubbles
In the previous section we described the zones of attraction around fundamental
and bubble equilibria in a deterministic environment. In a stochastic environ-
ment the exchange rate will constantly be ”thrown around” in these diﬀerent
zones of attraction. It is threfore useful to simulate the model in a stochastic
environment to ﬁnd out how frequently the exchange rate will be attracted by
bubble equilibria.
We analyse this issue by simulating the stochastic version of the model and
by counting the number of periods the exchange rate is involved in a bubble. We
deﬁne a bubble here to be a deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamen-
tal value by more than three times the standard deviation of the fundamental
variable for a signiﬁcant interval of time. We have set this interval equal to 20
periods. We show the result of such an exercise in ﬁgure 9 for diﬀerent values of
the technical traders’ extrapolation parameter β and the rate of revision γ.I t
shows the percentage of time the exchange rate is involved in a bubble dynam-
ics. We observe that when β and γ a r es m a l lt h ef r e q u e n c yo ft h eo c c u r r e n c e
of bubbles is small. The frequency of bubbles increases exponentially with the
size of the parameters β and γ. Thus, the extrapolation by technical traders
β and the rate of revision γ are important parameters aﬀecting the frequency
with which bubbles occur.
The previous results allow us to shed some additional light on the nature
of bubbles and crashes. As we have seen before, bubbles arise because agents
are attracted by the risk-adjusted proﬁtability of the extrapolating (technical
traders) rule, and this attraction in turn makes this forecasting rule more prof-
itable, leading to a self-fulﬁlling increase in risk-adjusted proﬁtability. For this
dynamics to work, agents’ decision to switch must be suﬃciently sensitive to
t h er e l a t i v er i s k - a d j u s t e dp r o ﬁtabilities of the rules. If it is not the case, no
bubble equilibria can arise. The larger is γ t h em o r el i k e l yi ti st h a tt h e s es e l f -
fulﬁlling bubble equilibria arise. The interesting aspect of this result is that in a
world where agents are very sensitive to changing proﬁt opportunities, bubbles
become more likely than in a world where agents do not react quickly to these
new proﬁt opportunities19.
19The policy implication of this result is that by increasing the inertia in the system so
that agents react less quickly to changes in relative proﬁtabilities of forecasting rules, the
authorities could reduce the probability of the occurrence of bubbles. How this can be done
and whether some form of taxation of exchange transactions can do this, is a question we




7 Permanent shocks and bubbles
In his classic book ”Manias, Panics, and Crashes. A History of Financial Crises”
Kindleberger identiﬁe so n es o u r c eo ft h ee m e r g e n e n c eo fb u b b l e si nt h es t o c k
markets to be a shock such as a technological innovation or an institutional
change that aﬀect the the long run proﬁtability prospects of ﬁrms. We checked
whether this historical analysis of the emergence of bubbles is mimicked in our
model. The way we did this is to assume that a positive and permanent shock
o c c u r si nt h ef u n d a m e n t a lv a l u eo ft h ea s s e tp r i c e( t h ee x c h a n g er a t e ) .W es e t
this shock equal to +4. It occurs at the start of the simulation. We then analysed
t h es o l u t i o n so ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ef o rd i ﬀerent initial shocks (noise) and for dif-
ferent values of β. The results are shown in ﬁgure 10. We have indicated the
new and permanent value of the fundamental exchange rate by the vertical plane
through +4. We observe an important asymmetry in the space of fundamental
and bubble equilibria. Compared to the symmetric case of ﬁgure 7, the hor-
izontal plane collecting the fundamental equilibrium has shifted to the left20.
This means that relatively small positive noise in the initial conditions leads
to bubble equilibria for all values of β, while one needs large negative noise to
obtain (negative) bubble equilibria. Thus the model predicts that when a pos-
itive shock occurs in the fundamental, the probability of obtaining a (positive)
bubble equilibrium increases.
This result may also explain why in stock markets positive bubbles appear
to be more common than negative bubbles. In a growing economy, positive and
permanent shocks in the fundamental occur more frequently than negative ones.
20Note that the horizontal plane has also shifted upwards by +4, but this is not very visible.
22Figure 10:
Our model then predicts that in such an environment positive bubbles will arise
more frequently than negative ones. Note that, in the foreign exchange market,
a positive bias in the fundamental shocks is less likely to occur, because the
fundamental exchange rate is the result of a diﬀerential between domestic and
foreign variables. Thus, bubbles in the foreign exchange markets are more likely
to be both negative and positive ones.
8 Why crashes occur
The model makes clear why bubbles arise in a stochastic environment. It may
not be clear yet why bubbles are always followed by crashes. Here again shocks
in the fundamental are of great importance. In order to analyse this issue we
performed the following experiment. We ﬁxed the initial condition at some value
(+5) that produces a bubble equilibrium (for a given parameter conﬁguration).
We then introduced permanent changes in the fundamental value (ranging from
-10 to +10) and computed the attractors for diﬀerent values of β. We show the
r e s u l t so ft h i se x e r c i s ei nﬁgure 11. On the x-axis we show the diﬀerent fun-
damental values of the exchange rate, while on the y-axis we have the diﬀerent
values of β. The vertical axis shows the attractors (exchange rate solutions). The
upward sloping plane is the collection of fundamental equilibria. It is upward
sloping (45%) because an increase in the fundamental rate by say 5 leads to an
equilibrium exchange rate of 5. For low values of β we always have fundamental
equilibria. This result matches the results of ﬁgure 7 where we found that for
low β’s all initial conditions lead to a fundamental equilibrium.
23The major ﬁnding of ﬁgure 11 is that when permanent shocks in the fun-
damental are small relative to the initial (temporary) shock, (+5) we obtain
bubble equilibria. The corollary of this result is that when the fundamental
shock is large enough relative to the noise, we obtain a fundamental equilib-
rium. Thus if an initial temporary shock has brought the exchange rate in a
bubble equilibrium, a suﬃciently large fundamental shock will lead to a crash.
In a stochastic environment in which the fundamental rate is driven by a ran-
dom walk (permanent shocks), any bubble must at some point crash because
the attactive forces of the fundamental accumulate over time and overcome the
temporary dynamics of the bubble.
The interesting aspect of this result is that the crash occurs irrespective of
whether the fundamental shock is positive or negative. Since we have a positive
bubble, it is easy to understand that a negative shock in the fundamental can
trigger a crash. A positive shock has the same eﬀect though. The reason is
that a suﬃciently large positive shock in the fundamental makes fundamentalist
forecasting more proﬁtable, thereby increasing the number of fundamentlists in
the market and leading to a crash (to the new and higher fundamental rate).
Put diﬀerently, while in the short run, technical traders exploit the noise to
start a bubble, in the long run when the fundamental rate inexorably moves in
one or the other direction, fundamentalists forecasting becomes attractive.
It is also interesting to note that as β increases, the size of the shocks in the
fundamental necessary to bring the exchange rate back to its fundamental rate
increases. In a stochastic environment this means that bubbles will be stronger
and longer-lasting when β increases.
Figure 11:
In conclusion, it is worth noting that shocks in fundamentals both act as
24triggers for the emergence of a bubble (see previous section) and as triggers
for its subsequent crash. The intuition can be explained as follows. When the
exchange rate is in a fundamental equilibrium, an unexpected and permanent
increase in the fundamental, sets in motion an upward movement of the ex-
change rate towards the new fundamental. This is the result of the action by
fundamentalists. This upward movement, however, also makes extrapolative
forecasting (technical trading) increasingly proﬁtable and can lead to a bubble.
When the exchange rate is in a bubble equilibrium, a large enough (positive
or negative) shock in the fundamental strenghtens the hand of fundamentalists’
forecasting, and attracts agents towards this forecasting rule. This then leads
to a crash.
As in the case of the bubble, the prediction of the timing of the crash is made
diﬃcult because of the fuzziness (complexity) of the border between bubble and
fundamental equilibria (ﬁgure 11). Thus, although crashes are inevitable, their
exact timing is unknown. The remarkable aspect of this result is that it is
obtained in a deterministic model.
9 Rational versus ”behavioural” bubbles
We can now contrast the diﬀerence between ”rational bubbles” and the bubbles
obtained in our model, which we will label ”behavioural” bubbles. A ”rational
bubble” is obtained in a model in which agents use all available information
including the underlying structure of the model and in which they know the
distribution of the underlying stochastic variables. In such a model bubbles
are movements of the exchange rate (asset price) along an explosive path. The
latter is one of the inﬁnitely many unstable solutions obtained in a rational
expectations model where agents are fully and perfectly informed.
In models with perfectly and fully informed agents modeling a crash is a
challenging task. In a perfect foresight model a bubble with a crash cannot exist
because when the timing of the crash is known (and by deﬁnition this is known in
a perfect foresight model) agents will anticipate this and by backward induction
prevent the bubble from happening. The insight provided by Blanchard and
Watson(1982) was to show that a bubble followed by a crash is possible in
a stochastic rational expectations model. The crash occurs in such a model
because agents attach some positive probability of a future crash. As a result,
inevitably at some point a probable event becomes reality and a crash occurs.
Agents, however, cannot predict when this will happen. The uncertainty about
the exact time of the crash is necessary to make a ”rational bubble” possible.
We argued earlier that the ”rational bubble” theory has no good explanation
of why crashes occur21. The only reason why these occur is that they are assumed
21The Blanchard-Watson rational bubble model can also be criticised for the fact that it
predicts the occurrence of bubbles whose features are not found in empirical evidence. For
example, it predicts that the bubbles are exponentially distributed, whereas the empirical
evidence suggests that there are fat tails in the distribution of bubbles (see Mandelbrot(1997)
and Lux and Sornette (2002)). In addition, the rational bubble model predicts that there is
25to occur. The assumption that crashes must occur sounds reasonable since whe
have not observed an everlasting bubble. It is, however, imposed in an ad-
hoc way, from outside the model22. In models where rational and irrational
agents interact (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann(1990), Shleifer and
Vishny(1997), and Abreu and Brunnermeier(2003)), bubbles arise because of
a failure of arbitrage by the rational agents. These models also assume that
crashes occur for exogenous reasons.
Another implication of the ”rational bubble” model is that the exchange rate
(asset price) is always on a bubble path. The reason is that the fundamental
solution has a knife-edge property (saddle path). This means that the slightest
deviation from the fundamental path brings the exchange rate on an unstable
path. In a stochastic environment these slight deviations are inevitable. Thus
the ”rational bubble” theory predicts that the exchange rate will permanently
be on a bubble path.
In our model a bubble is an equilibrium (a ﬁxed point attractor) to which the
exchange rate is attracted if exogenous shocks brings it in the basin of attraction
of the bubble equilibrium. At the same time the fundamental equilibrium is lo-
cally stable. This makes the ”behavioural” bubble fundamentally diﬀerent from
the ”rational bubble”. First, in our behavioural model one needs a suﬃciently
large shock away form the fundamental to move the exchange rate towards a
bubble attractor. Thus in ”normal” times the exchange rate is driven by its
fundamental value. This contrasts with the ”rational bubble” theory in which
the fundamental equilibrium is unstable, so that the exchange rate is always
on an unstable bubble path. Second, the forces that lead to a bubble are the
same as the forces that lead to a crash. We showed that large shocks in the
fundamental increase the probability of the occurrence of a bubble. Once in a
bubble equilibrium a suﬃciently large shock in the fundamental leads to a crash.
In this sense our model provides for a theory of both the occurrence of a bub-
ble and its subsequent crash. Third, the timing of the bubble and of the crash
is uncertain. This uncertainty is not imposed exogenously but comes from the
structure of the model. For we have shown that the basins of attraction around
the fundamental and the bubble equilibrium have a fractal nature. As a result,
the exact timing of the bubble and of the crash is dependent on ”trivial events”.
The view of a bubble as an equilibrium concept is reminiscent of the notion of
”sunspots” which is also an equilibrium concept in rational expectations models
(see Blanchard and Fischer(1996), p255, and Azariadis and Guesnerie(1984)).
Sunspot equilibria arise because some agents believe that an arbitrary variable
(sunspots) inﬂuences the asset price. As a result, rational agents who know
this, attach some probability that a sunspot equilibrium will be reached. In our
symmetry between bubble and crash phases, i.e. that after the crash the asset price returns
to its fundamental value. Again, this does seem to square with the empirical evidence (see
Sornette(2003)).
22There is an important literature analysing the conditions under which rational bubbles
occur in general equilibrium models. In general, the conditions for such bubbles to occur
are tighter in these models than in partial equilibrium models because of some ﬁniteness
condition(e.g. a ﬁnite number of individuals, see Tirole(1982)). Typically these models have
not been concerned with an explicit modelling of the crash.
26model a bubble equilibrium exists because some agents use extrapolative fore-
casting rules which under certain conditions can crowd out agents who believe
in the existence of a fundamental value of the exchange rate. Thus, a bubble
equilibrium is possible not because some agents are irrational and believe that
sunspots aﬀect the exchange rate, but because these agents are agnostic about
the existence of fundamentals (including sunspots), and therefore rely only on
t h ep a s te x c h a n g er a t em o v e m e n t sa st h es o u r c eo ft h e i ri n f o r m a t i o n .
10 Informational issues
The model developed in this paper can be used to illustrate the nature of the
informational problem agents face. We have used a model in which the infor-
mational assumption is that agents cannot comprehend and process the full
complexity of the environment they face, and therefore use an informational
strategy that consists in trying simple forecasting rules, subjecting these ex
post to a ﬁtness criterion. The results of the model suggest that this is the right
strategy to follow. For despite its simplicity, our model creates an informational
environment that is too complex to understand and to process for an individual
agent. To see this let us return to ﬁgure 7 and concentrate on the parameter
values that lie close to the boundary between fundamental and bubble equilib-
ria. Suppose agents in need of forecasting, use the information provided by the
underlying model. They have estimated β to be 0.815 with a standard error of
0.005 (a remarkable econometric feat). Suppose then that the initial condition
happens to be +5. One is tempted to think that this should be suﬃcient in-
formation to predict with reasonable certainty whether the exchange rate will
be attracted by a fundamental or by a bubble equilibrium. In order to check
whether this is the case we take a ”slice” of ﬁgure 7 at the initial condition =
+5. We show this in ﬁgure 12(a).
We observe that with a value of β around 0.815 we can have a fundamental
or a bubble equilibrium. In order to see clearer, we enlarge the ﬁgure so that
we obtain the ﬁxed attractors for values of β between 0.81 and 0.82. The result
is given in ﬁgure 12(b). Thus, even with such a sharp estimate of β agents will
be uncertain whether a fundamental or bubble equilibrium will prevail. We ﬁnd
that there are 22 fundamental and 78 bubble equilibria within the estimated
range of β’s.
Suppose, now that a new econometric technique allows these agents to re-
duce the standard error by a factor of 10 so that they now estimate β to be
located between 0.8145 and 0.8155. It would now appear from the previous ﬁg-
ure 12(b) that agents can increase the precision with which they can predict the
probability of a bubble equilibrium. This conclusion would be incorrect, how-
ever. We show this by enlarging the ﬁgure 12(b) around the parameter value
of β =0 .815. The result is shown in ﬁgure 12(c). We observe that the higher
precision of the estimate of β has not increased the precision with which agents
can predict whether a fundamental or a bubble equilibrium will prevail. Within
that narrower range of estimated βsw en o wﬁnd 23 bubble equilibria (out of
27100). Successive further enlargements around 0.815 show that this proportion
remains approximately constant. This result has to do with the fractal nature of
the boundary between the fundamental and bubble equilibria. Every successive
enlargement will reveal the same structure. The agents would need inﬁnite pre-
cision to be able to predict whether with a given initial condition, a particular
parameter value will lead to a bubble equilibrium.
This problem is compounded by the fact that the ”border values” of β depend
on the initial shock. We show this by ”cutting another slice” from ﬁgure 7 at
the initial condition equal to +6. We show the result in ﬁgure 13. We ﬁnd that
with this new initial condition, the border values of β are located around 0.75,
with a similarly complex feature.
We conclude that agents need inﬁnite precision in their knowledge of the
initial conditions and the parameter β (and in fact also the other parameters
o ft h em o d e l )t ob ea b l et op r e d i c tw h e t h e rt h ee x c h a n g er a t ew i l lm o v et oa
fundamental or a bubble equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, inﬁnitesimally small errors
in computing the initial conditions or in estimating β (and the other parameters)
lead to very large errors in predicting the exchange rate. Thus,even in the very
simple model we developed here, individual agents face enormous informational
problems, that they cannot hope to solve. This helps to understand why agents
will not attempt to use all the information provided by the underlying structural
model.
11 Conclusion
Up to now theoretical analysis of bubbles and crashes has been done almost ex-
clusively in the context of models with perfectly and fully informed agents. This
has led to the theory of ”rational bubbles”. In this paper we use an alternative
framework in which agents are boundedly rational. We apply this framework
to analyse the emergence and the subsequent disappearance of bubbles in the
foreign exchange market. The analysis could easily be extended to other asset
markets.
The special feature of our model is that individual agents recognize that
they are not capable of understanding and processing the complex information
structure of the underlying model. As a result, they use simple rules to forecast
the exchange rates. These agents can be said to be boundedly rational That is,
agents check the ’ﬁtness’ (proﬁtability) of the forecasting rule at each point in
time and decide to reject the rule if it is less proﬁtable (in a risk adjusted sense)
than competing rules. Our model is in the tradition of evolutionary dynamics
where agents use trial and error strategies. We assume that some of the forecast-
ing rules are based on extrapolating past exchange rate movements (technical
trading) and others are based on mean reversion towards the fundamental rate
(fundamentalism).
The model generates two types of equilibria. The ﬁrst one, which we called
a fundamental equilibrium, is one in which the exchange rate converges to its
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fundamental value. The exchange rate, however, can also converge to a second
type of equilibrium, which we called a bubble equilibrium, and which is reached
in a self-fulﬁlling manner. An important feature of the bubble equilibrium is that
technical traders (extrapolative forecasting) take over most of the market, so
that fundamental inﬂuences on the exchange rate disappear. We simulated the
model in a stochastic environment and generated complex scenarios of bubbles
and crashes. One interesting aspect of the model is that it explains both the
emergence of the bubble and its subsequent crash. That is, we found that the
forces that trigger the emergence of a bubble are the same as those that lead to
its collapse. This contrasts with the ”rational bubble” model that has not found
a satisfactory explanation for a crash to occur yet.
We also analysed under what conditions bubbles and crashes occur. We
found that when agents react strongly to changing relative proﬁtabilities of the
diﬀerent forecasting rules, the frequency of bubbles increases. Similarly, when
technical analysts tend to extrapolate past movements of the exchange rate
aggressively, the probability of bubbles and crashes increases.
Our model also conﬁrms what has been noted by economic historians, i.e.
that bubbles typically arise in the wake of a large shock in a fundamental variable
(e.g. a new technological development). We found that large positive shocks in
the fundamental increases the probability of a bubble dynamics.
The theory of bubbles and crashes that we propose in this paper is diﬀerent
from the ”rational bubble” theory. The diﬀerence exists at two levels. First, in
our model bubbles are equilibria (ﬁxed point attractors). These can be reached
because certain shocks lead ”fundamentalists” to be crowded out by technical
traders in a self-fulﬁlling manner. One needs a suﬃciently large shock in the
fundamental variables, however, for this to happen. This contrasts with the
”rational bubble” theory which deﬁnes a bubble as an explosive path of the
30asset price. Since the fundamental equilibrium path is unstable (knife-edge)
the asset price will be permanently involved in an explosive bubble and crash
dynamics in a stochastic rational expectations model.
Our bubble equilibria are also diﬀerent from sunspot equilibria which arise
in models where some (irrational) agents give importance to some arbitrary
variables (sunspots) in the determination of the asset price. In contrast to these
sunspot equilibria, our bubble equilibria arise because sometimes the market
is dominated by agents who are agnostic about the fundamental variables that
drive the asset price.
The theory of bubbles and crashes proposed in this paper diﬀers from the
rational bubble theory in a second and more profound manner. Models of bub-
bles that have gone beyond the Blanchard-Watson model, have been based on
a dichotomy between types of agents assumed in the model, whereby one type
is assumed to be rational and to understand the complexity of the world, while
another type consists of irrational agents. This dichotomy between rational and
irrational agents who operate in the same model creates the issue of why soci-
ety is divided between agents with completely diﬀerent intellectual capacities.
Is this a diﬀerence in genetic characteristics? Or is it related to diﬀerences in
education? These are unsurmountable problems. They can be avoided by mak-
ing a simpler assumption about human society. This is that all agents have
limited capabilities in understanding the world. Instead of assuming that some
agents are rational and others are not, it seems more reasonable to assume
that all agents are boundedly rational. This is what we have done in this paper.
The assumption of bounded rationality generates a simpler and, therefore, more
poweful model.
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In this appendix we show the ratio of the variance of the fundamentalist and
chartists σ2
f,t and σ2
c,t as it converges to its steady state value. We simulated
the model for diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations and diﬀerent initial values of
the exchange rate. In each case we found that the variance ratio converged to
1 as the system approached the steady state. In section 3.2 we describe in more
detail how these simulations are set up.
Figure 14:
35B Appendix 2 : Numerical values of the para-
meters used in the base simulation
I nt h ef o l l o w i n gt a b l ew ep r e s e n tt h en u m e r i c a lv a l u e so ft h em o d e l .I nt h eﬁrst
column we listed the parameters of the model, in the second column we present
the numerical values in the base simulations. The last column indicates whether
or not we have performed a sensitivity analysis on these numerical values. If
not, we use the same numerical value in all simulations.
Table 1: Numerical values of parameters
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36C Appendix 3: Causality tests between exchange
rate and technical traders weight
In this appendix we present the results of causality tests between the exchange
rate and the weight of technical traders (chartists) during a bubble and crash
episode. We simulated the model using the standard set of parameters, and we
selected an episode during which a bubble and crash occurred. We show such an
episode in ﬁgure A2. A visual inspection of the graph reveals that the exchange
rate appears to lead the technical traders weight, at least when the bubble starts
and later when the bubble bursts. Note also that the crash occurs faster than
the bubble phase, a feature we often ﬁnd in our simulated bubbles and crashes.













exchange rate chartist weight
Exchange rate and chartist weight during bubble
Next we performed a Granger causality test on the exchange rate and the
chartist weight during the bubble and crash episode represented in ﬁgure A223.
The result of this causality test is presented in table A1. We observe that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the exchange rate leads the technical traders’
weight during the bubble and crash episode, while we can reject the reverse. We
ﬁnd this feature in most bubble and crash episodes.
23We checked for stationarity and could not reject that the two series are stationary during
the sample period.
37Table 2: Granger causality tests
Null Hypothesis: F-statistic Probability
cw not Granger cause exchange rate 0.377 0.865
exchange rate not Granger cause cw 6.85 6.4E-06
Note: obs=211, lags=5.
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